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I. Introduction 
 
 In the midst of the current recession the short-term loan sector of the consumer credit 
industry has grown rapidly, or namely, payday lenders.  Payday lender operations and other 
short-term loan outlets in the United States have nearly tripled in number in the last decade or so 
and growing evidence has shown that they are causing their borrowers more harm than good 
through their predatory practices.  Access to affordable credit is a major issue in community and 
economic development and is in need of close scholarly attention in this time of recession.  It has 
been shown that payday lending is the fastest growing segment of the consumer credit industry.  
It has become commonplace in the United States since bank deregulation took place in the 
1980’s and as traditional banking institutions have become less common.  This trend seems to be 
more concentrated in inner city areas where there are a higher proportion of credit-constrained 
borrowers (Graves 2003).  Since the 1990’s 22,000 payday loan operations have been established 
which collectively generate $27 billion annually in loans (Parrish and King 2009). 
 The purpose of this paper is to address a gap in theory pertaining to the relation between 
payday lending activity in each state and the level of trust and social capital in that state.  Most of 
the studies done thus far regarding payday lending focus on the negative effects of the loans on 
borrowers’ financial situations, lenders’ predatory practices, and the economic impact of these 
components.  Many also perform location analyses of payday lenders, looking at the types of 
borrowers targeted, the types of communities targeted, and their characteristics.  Studies have 
also looked at borrower knowledge and perceptions of payday lenders and the alternative options 
available.  No study has explicitly looked at the association between predatory lending and the 
overall level of trust and social capital in a community.  Multiple years of data is employed in 
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this study to examine both the concentration of payday lenders in each state in relation to trust 
and the volume of payday activity in relation to trust.   
 The findings of this study may be useful as supportive research in guiding advocacy 
efforts regarding the predatory lending industry, as well as economic and community 
development efforts aimed at building community trust and reducing harmful community 
behaviors.  Policy implications for the findings of this study include formulating policy that aims 
to increase levels of social capital and trust in communities.  As there are many benefits to 
increasing the level of social capital and trust in communities, reducing payday lending activity 
and predatory lending more generally is but one of these possible benefits.  The findings of this 
study will shed light on an unexamined aspect of community life that contributes to predatory 
lending and will aid in efforts to curb this lending locally by providing valuable insight into its 
causes.   
The literature available on payday lending tends to confirm a few conclusions.  The location 
analysis papers seem to agree that payday lenders cluster in regions with higher percentages of 
ethnic populations, higher poverty rates, and in lower income areas.  Payday lenders tend to have 
some positive effect for those who use them for emergencies, but most borrowers use them for 
recurring expenses and in this case they have a negative impact.  Consistent with Adair Morse’s 
prediction, Nathalie Martin finds that borrowers do not tend to understand the workings of the 
loan, the total cost, or know about other options, and tend to be worse off after their use.  
Turning to the trust literature, the trust level in a community can partly determine the resources 
available for the less fortunate, such as volunteer time, supportive policies, and overall economic 
equality.  Others look at the relationship between social capital and development which tends to 
be positive (Baliamoune-Lutz 2011).  These studies agree that communities with less social 
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capital are more economically depressed, and location studies complete the picture by showing 
that predatory lenders are more likely to locate in these communities 
The following section summarizes the pertinent literature and research findings 
pertaining to the relationship between trust measures per state and their payday lending activity.  
The next sections outline the theoretical model and hypothesis used in this analysis, the 
corresponding empirical model used, the data used and some descriptive statistics, the results of 
the regression analyses, and closing discussion and conclusions. 
II.    Literature Review 
Background and Theoretical Developments 
 
According to some scholars the payday loan industry has grown from the salary-buying 
business of the early twentieth century wherein salary buyers advanced cash with a wage 
assignment as collateral.  The salary buyer could threaten to show the wage assignment to the 
borrower’s employer if the loan was not paid or renewed in time, and the employer might then 
have terminated the employee.  Another view is that payday lending grew out of the prominent 
check-cashing business in the 1990’s when the business started to cash post-dated checks for an 
additional charge.  Either way, the first payday lending operation emerged in the South in the 
1980’s after bank deregulation (Graves 2003).   
The major difference between these loan outlets and others in the financial sector is that 
they are designed to make loan products available that borrowers cannot afford to pay off.  
Traditional lenders will go through a specific assessment process to make sure that the 
prospective borrower has the ability to repay the loan.  Payday lenders do not make this 
assessment as making loans that borrowers cannot afford to pay back in full are specifically 
written into their business model.  Customers therefore will make repeated payments on the same 
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small principal that was originally borrowed because they cannot repay the loan in full and want 
to avoid consequences.  It is important to note that these are interest-only loans, and the borrower 
cannot pay down the principal unless it is paid all at once.  These lenders impose short term due 
dates which oftentimes force borrowers to take out a new loan just to pay off the original (CRL 
2011).   
Payday lending operations claim that their purpose is to serve communities neglected by 
traditional banking facilities by providing them with quick cash in the case of emergencies.  
Payday lending activity, however, seems to disproportionately affect poor and minority 
neighborhoods.  These loans are designed specifically to pull borrowers into a debt trap that 
exploits them for their limited financial resources.  The borrower ends up in an endless trap of 
paying fees every two weeks to float, or rollover, the original interest-only loan because they 
cannot make ends meet if they pay the entire loan, and thus end the trap.  The borrowers feel 
forced to pay the fees due to the threat of building up bounced check fees from the check cashed 
by the lender and other aggressive collection practices, such as the threat of criminal charges for 
bouncing a check (CRL 2011).   
In this situation, the borrowers have little choice but to pay the fees every two weeks 
while keeping their original debt outstanding, and in most cases they end up paying 10 times the 
amount of the principal in fees.  Making these loans due in full on payday virtually guarantees 
that low-income customers will need to take out another loan or float the current loan by paying 
fees before they receive their next paycheck.  This loan churning “accounts for 76% of total loan 
volume, and for $20 billion of the industry’s $27 billion in annual loan originations.”   Loan 
turnover, or repeat borrowing, costs households $3.5 billion extra in fees per year (Parrish and 
King 2009).  Needless to say, payday lending is an extremely profitable industry.  Repeat 
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customers are essential to the success of a payday loan operation, and many lenders will institute 
reward programs and offers to turn their borrowers into long term customers.   
A 2006 report done by the Center for Responsible Lending finds that 90% of the payday 
lending industry revenue comes from borrowers who are not able to pay off their loans when 
they are due, turning them into repeat borrowers.  Paying fees at higher than 400% annual 
percentage rate multiple times to flip the same loan until they can pay off the entire loan traps 
these consumers in a hard-to-escape and costly cycle of debt.  The study reports that payday 
lending costs American households $4.2 billion per year in excessive fees, which on average 
amounts to $793 in fees for a typical $325 loan (King et. al 2006). 
There has been a plethora of research done to study the payday loan industry.  John P. 
Caskey prepared a report in 2002 on the economics of payday lending for the Center for Credit 
Union Research.  Survey results suggest that payday loan customers tend to be from lower-
middle income households and they also tend to be younger than the general adult population 
and have children.  More than half of customers are female and are less likely to have a college 
degree.  Most customers do not use payday loans on an emergency basis and the short-term loan 
tends to evolve into long-term debt.  Regarding the regulatory environment, some states institute 
caps on interest rates, and many lenders avoid them by making agreements with banks in states 
without these limits and act as agents for the banks. 
A year later in 2003, John Lawford conducted a follow-up report on the alternative 
financial sector that provides numerous policy suggestions to regulate the payday loan industry.  
These include but are not limited to lender licensing, a consumer complaints mechanism, a cost-
of-credit disclosure, an APR statement in contracts and advertising, transaction data collection, 
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borrowing and rollover limits, and education and awareness campaigns for consumers (Lawford 
2003).   
Aside from reports describing the typical borrower and regulatory options, many studies 
have examined the location choices of stores and aim to describe the demographics of 
communities with a high concentration of payday loan operations.  Alice Gallmeyer and Wade 
Roberts performed a spatial analysis of the predatory lending industry in Colorado and their 
study produced a number of findings.  They maintain that the recent spread of economic 
insecurity and distress plus neglect by traditional financial institutions make a hospitable 
environment for predatory industries to grow.  This economic distress has been caused by the 
segmentation of the labor market, a decline in unionization, the erosion of minimum wage by 
inflation and overall higher levels of unemployment.  Also contributing to this insecurity is 
growing income inequality, stagnant wages, as well as income volatility.   
Gallmeyer and Roberts discovered disproportionate concentrations of payday lenders in 
poor, minority and military neighborhoods with discrimination by traditional lending institutions. 
They found this trend as well in immigrant communities and those with higher percentages of 
young and elderly populations.  In general, neighborhoods occupied by payday lenders are 
characterized by lower median household income and higher poverty rates, ethnic and racial 
minorities, immigrants, young adults, elderly, and active-duty military.   
A paper done earlier in 2003 by Steven Graves examines essentially the same question in 
metro Louisiana and Cook County, Illinois.  Also using comparison of means tests and GIS 
mapping, Graves finds that disenfranchised neighborhoods, those which higher numbers of poor 
and minority residents, are simultaneously targeted by payday lenders and neglected by 
traditional banks.  In addition, a study of payday lender entry decisions in Oregon confirms that 
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minority populations provide fertile ground for their operations (Damar 2009).  As for their 
purpose, high-interest loans such as these have been found to only minimally mitigate individual 
financial distress caused by natural disasters and emergencies.  However, it is difficult to know if 
these fringe lending institutions cause financial constraint or if the circumstance of financial 
constraint attracts these institutions (Morse 2011).  It is also essential to look into the literature 
on trust and social capital. 
Reviewing the literature on the subject of trust, Uslaner finds that moralistic trust binds 
us to others, and that the main determining factors in generalized trust are a person’s level of 
optimism and perceived control.  Fukayama claims that moralistic trust “…arises when a 
community shares a set of moral values in such a way as to create regular expectations of regular 
and honest behavior” and that allows the community members to face fewer risks when seeking 
agreement on collective problems.  Further, Yamigishi asserts that moralistic trust is based upon 
“…belief in the goodwill of the other.”  Generalized trust refers to attitudes towards “most 
people” and does not mention context, such as whether most people can be trusted to repay a 
specified loan.  This type of context “appears to be implicit in moralistic trust.”  Some distrust 
others due to a lifetime history of disappointments and in this type of environment, people are 
protecting themselves from the “threat of calamity” (2001).   
The purpose of this paper is to address a gap in theory pertaining to the relation between 
payday lending activity and presence and the level of trust and social capital in a community.  
Most of the studies done thus far on predatory lending emphasize the negative effects of these 
loans on the borrowers’ financial situation, predatory practices, and the economic impact of 
payday lenders.  Many also perform location analyses of payday lenders, looking at the types of 
borrowers targeted, the types of communities targeted, and their characteristics.  Studies have 
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also looked at borrower knowledge and perceptions of payday lenders and the available 
alternative options.  No study has explicitly looked at the association between predatory lending 
and social capital or overall trust measures of a community.  Panel data is employed to identify 
the trend over time, and to examine both the concentration of payday lenders in each state in 
relation to trust and the volume of payday activity in relation to trust.  Other pertinent variables 
are included, such as mean income to isolate the effect of overall trust levels on the use of 
payday lenders. 
III. Theoretical Analysis 
Regarding the theory behind trust and its association with predatory lending, it has been 
asserted that those countries with more trusting people have less economic inequality.  They are 
more likely to have better government, more redistributive policies for the poor, more open 
markets, and less corruption (Uslaner 2001).  Another argument found in the literature claims 
that community economic constraints, which breed general and moralistic distrust, lead to higher 
payday lender concentration as well as a higher volume of loans taken out by the community 
(Morse 2011). Distrust of others can result from a lifetime of disappointments and broken 
promises.  A history of poverty can lead people to see “all who stand outside the immediate 
family as potential enemies, battling for the meager bounty that nature has provided” (Uslaner 
2001).   
It has also been cited by Hanieh et. al. in 2011 that trust, governance, and freedom all have a 
significant positive effect on social capital, though governance has the greatest effect.  Trust is 
important in improving social capital, and in turn social capital, defined as connections within 
and between social networks, plays a role in improving economic performance (2011).  Further, 
optimism affects the level of trust; lower optimism is characteristic of economically depressed 
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communities which influences their level of trust (Uslaner 2011).  In an earlier paper, Uslaner 
declares that “trust in other people has different roots than confidence in any institution – and 
does not change much in the short run” (2009).  Uslaner goes on to assert that generalized trust 
has been in decline since the 1970’s which is more attributable to long-term trends such as rising 
income inequality rather than short-term economic trends (2009).  Due to the fact that trust measures 
change relatively little in the short-run, the trust measures collected for 2008 per state is also used in place of 2009 
and 2010 data, which was not available. 
In light of these relationships, it can be posited that low levels of trust can generate and 
perpetuate a poor or distressed economic environment, which would in turn cause community 
members to take advantage of payday loans more often.  This sets up the theoretical background 
for the empirical analysis done in this paper.  It provides the framework for the following 
predictions and hypothesis: as the level of trust in a community – in this case in each state – 
increases, the level of payday lending activity will decrease, all other factors being held constant.  
The intuition behind this prediction follows from the literature review and theoretical 
background that has been provided.  It can be argued that if the level of trust in a community 
falls over time, the social fabric of the community disintegrates and the social capital slowly 
breaks down.  The level of trust could decrease for a number of reasons, some of which being 
overall economic distress of a community (which lends to a bidirectional effect of trust and 
payday lending activity which is not explored in this paper), the social and cultural climate of a 
community, and the political environment.  Poorly constructed policies, war, political scandals, 
highly unequal power dynamics, social upheaval, unrest and social movements, and a difficult 
economic environment including worsening income inequality can contribute to a lowered level 
of community trust.  A difficult economic environment could be caused by a number of factors 
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as well, such as a trough in the business cycle, the economic climate of neighboring 
communities, foreign policy, weather patterns, shifts in political power, and structural changes in 
the labor market.  Going even further, structural changes in the labor market could be caused by 
technological advances, changes in the modes of production and globalization, among others.  If 
any of these factors negatively affect the level of trust, the community’s social capital starts to 
diminish, and this negatively affects its economic performance.  The economic performance of 
the area is measured by such factors as productivity and gross domestic product, growth, 
unemployment, as well as area credit ratings and rate of default on money borrowed.   
In this environment public confidence is eroded, and this lends to the banking industry’s 
decision to tighten lending and enforce stricter requirements for extending credit.  This 
demonstrates why traditional banking institutions have become less willing to lend to 
populations that are most in need of their assets and tend to neglect these areas, and hence why 
predatory lenders find these areas fertile ground on which to locate to take advantage of those 
most in need of credit.   
The variables used in this study include payday lending activity as the dependent 
variables including number of payday lenders per state – normalized by dividing by population - 
and total dollar amount borrowed per state, also normalized by dividing by population.  The 
independent variables of interest include various measures of trust and one of social capital.  This 
data is taken from the trust question included in the DDB Lifestyle Survey, the trust question 
included in the American National Election Survey, and the social capital index created by 
Bowling Alone author Robert Putnam.  Additional independent variables serving to control for 
other factors affecting payday lending activity include gross domestic product per state 
normalized by dividing by population, the unemployment rate per state, the poverty rate per 
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state, total educational enrollment per state normalized by population, minority populations per 
state as a percentage of total population, and lastly the young and elderly population (those 
between ages 18-29 and age 65 and up) combined as a percentage of the total population.  Data 
for these variables were collected for 2005, 2008, 2009 and 2010.  The variables are notated as 
follows: the normalized number of payday lenders per state is written as lenders, and the 
normalized total dollar amount borrowed per state is referred to as borrowed05 as there is only 
data available for this variable for 2005.  Population is referred to as pop, normalized gross 
domestic product is referred to as gdp, unemployment is written as un, poverty is written as pov, 
normalized total educational enrollment is referred to as educ, percentage minority is written as 
min, and the percentage young and elderly is referred to as age.  The independent variables of 
interest are referred to as ddb05 for the trust question in the DDB Lifestyle Survey conducted in 
2005, ddb08 for the trust question in the DDB Lifestyle Survey conducted in 2008, anes08 for 
the trust question in the American National Election Survey conducted in 2008, and basoccap for 
Robert Putnam’s social capital index.   
 Various assumptions were made in performing this study.  One assumption is that the 
number of payday lenders per state is a good proxy to measure the payday lending activity per 
state.  The correlation between the total dollar amount borrowed and number of payday lenders 
per state in 2005, .963, is high enough to assume they are both useful proxies for payday lending 
activity.  Another assumption made is that the control variables included were sufficient to 
account for all other factors affecting payday lending activity.  Further, it is assumed that the 
DDB Lifestyle Survey and American National Election Survey question on trust are accurate 
enough to be aggregated and used for each state to reflect attitudes of trust.  In addition, it is 
assumed that Ordinary Least Squares is the best method to carry out this analysis as Fixed 
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Effects could not be used since panel data for trust was not available.  It is further assumed that 
the trust measures change relatively little over the time period used.   
It is useful to include some examples of the theory in action.  An example of a general 
situation exhibiting this theory might be a family that is not close with its extended relatives and 
harbors a feeling of distrust for them.  In a time of economic hardship, such as when the main 
breadwinner of the family is laid off or if his or her hours are cut, the low levels of trust and 
weak connections between family members and relatives makes it more difficult for the family to 
make ends meet and to pay bills on time.  With no close relatives available whom the family 
members feel comfortable asking for a loan to get through their economic struggles, the family is 
more likely to go to the nearest payday lender and pay for the convenience of taking out an easy 
and quick loan.   
IV. Empirical Model  
To restate, the predictions of the theory avow that low levels of trust can generate and 
perpetuate a poor or distressed economic environment, which would in turn cause community 
members to take advantage of payday loans more often.  Mapping the theory to the empirical 
model used in this study, Ordinary Least Squares regression analysis was used to test the effect 
of an increase in the level of trust in each state, which serves as the independent variable of 
interest, on the level of payday lending activity in each state, which serves as the dependent 
variable.  Also included as explanatory variables to control for other factors that may influence 
payday lending activity per state were gross domestic product per capita, the unemployment rate, 
the poverty rate, the total educational enrollment normalized by population, the minority rate 
including the percentage of the population that is African American and Latino, and the 
percentage of the population that is age 18-29, considered to be the young segment of the 
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population, added to the percentage that is 65 and older, considered to be the older segment of 
the population.     
A total of six regressions were run with different combinations of proxies for both the 
trust measurement and the measure of payday lending activity.  The first regression included the 
number of payday lenders per capita as the dependent variable for the years 2008, 2009 and 
2010.  The 2008 DDB Lifestyle Survey trust question: “How much do you trust: People you 
meet for the first time?” in which respondents chose from a scale of 1-6 in which 1 indicates “Do 
not trust at all” and 6 indicates “Trust completely” serves as the independent variable of interest, 
and is calculated as a percentage of respondents who answered 4, 5 or 6.  The 2008 data for this 
variable was also used for 2009 and 2010.  The other independent variables used include: gross 
domestic product per capita for each state, the unemployment rate per state, the poverty rate per 
state, the total educational enrollment per capita for each state, the minority percentage of the 
population per state as mentioned before, as well as the percentage of the population aged 18-29 
and 65 and up, per state as mentioned before.  These variables were all collected for the years 
2008, 2009 and 2010.   
The parameter of interest, that for the 2008 DDB Lifestyle Survey trust question, is 
expected to be negative, and between -1 and 0.  The signs expected for the parameters of the 
other control variables are as follows: negative for GDP per capita, positive for the 
unemployment rate, positive for the poverty rate, negative for the total educational enrollment 
per capita, positive for the percentage minority, and positive for the percentage of the population 
18-29 plus 65 and up.  The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) empirical method was used to 
estimate the simple model’s parameters and is appropriate due to the nature of the theory, which 
is testing a new relationship.  The relationship between community trust levels and payday 
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lending activity has not been examined previously and thus OLS is a solid empirical method to 
use to begin shedding light on this topic.   Further, since panel data was not available for the trust 
variable, the data was not suitable for use with a fixed-effects regression model, which would be 
able to account for fixed effects affecting payday lending activity per state.  To test the 
hypothesis using OLS, the null hypothesis was such that the parameter on the trust variable 
would be statistically equal to zero, and the alternative hypothesis was such that the parameter on 
the trust variable would be statistically significant and less than zero.   
The remaining five regressions were carried out in much the same way.  The second 
regression also included the number of payday lenders per capita for the years 2008, 2009 and 
2010 for the dependent variable, but used the 2008 American National Election Survey’s 
(ANES) trust question: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people CAN BE 
TRUSTED, or that you CAN'T BE TOO CAREFUL in dealing with people?” in which 
respondents answered either 1 for “Most people can be trusted” and 2 for “Can’t be too careful” 
as the independent variable of interest, which is taken as the percentage of respondents that 
answered 1.  The same control variables are included in this regression and the remaining four 
regressions as well, and the signs are expected to be the same.  The parameter of interest, that for 
the 2008 ANES trust question is also expected to be negative and between -1 and 0.  The OLS 
empirical method was also used for this regression as well as the remaining four regressions and 
is appropriate for the same reasons.  The hypothesis testing was carried out in a similar way.  
The third regression uses the same model as the previous two regressions, but includes 
the total dollar amount borrowed in payday loans per capita for each state for only the year 2005 
as the dependent variable.  Total dollar amount borrowed per state was only available for the 
states included in this study for the year 2005, and therefore this regression was done using a 
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separate data set from the previous regressions using 2008, 2009 and 2010 data for the dependent 
variable and control variables.  The independent variable of interest used in this regression was 
the 2005 DDB Lifestyle Survey trust question: “Most people are honest” in which respondents 
chose from a scale of 1-6 in which 1 indicates “Definitely Disagree” and 6 indicates “Definitely 
Agree.”  This variable is also taken as a percentage of respondents who answered 4, 5 or 6.  As 
mentioned previously, the same control variables are included in this regression only for the year 
2005, and the signs are expected to be the same.  The parameter of interest, that for the 2005 
DDB Lifestyle Survey trust question is expected to be negative and between -1 and 0.   
The fourth regression uses the same independent variable of interest as the third 
regression, the 2005 DDB Lifestyle Survey trust question data, but this regression examines its 
effect on the number of lenders per capita in each state in 2005 since this data was available.  It 
is of interest to test the model both with the total dollar amount loaned per state as the dependent 
variable as well as the normalized number of payday lenders per state.  The parameter of interest, 
as above, is expected to be negative and between -1 and 0.  The same empirical method and 
control variables were used to test this model.   
The fifth and six regressions are very similar to the third and fourth. They make use of 
the same dependent variable, the total dollar amount borrowed per capita per state in 2005 in the 
fifth, and the number of payday lenders per capita per state in 2005 in the sixth.  However, the 
independent variable of interest in these two regressions is a new measure of trust, “Most people 
can be trusted” state-level social capital measure used in Robert Putnam’s book Bowling Alone 
and measured in 1999.  The parameter of interest, the Bowling Alone trust measure is also 
expected to be negative and even smaller than in the previous regressions since the trust data was 
measured for 1999.  The same empirical method and control variables were used.   
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Data 
The data used includes that which was mentioned above: the number of payday lenders in 
each state for the years 2008, 2009 and 2010 which was obtained from the Stephens, Inc. 
Industry Report on the payday loan industry in the United States completed in June of 2011 by 
David Burtzlaff and Brittny Groce.  Data for the payday loan volume per state and the number of 
payday lenders per state for the year 2005 was taken from the Center for Responsible Lending 
report done in 2006 entitled Financial Quicksand: Payday lending sinks borrowers in debt with 
$4.2 billion in predatory fees every year written by Uriah King, Leslie Parrish and Ozlem Tanik.  
These data were all normalized by dividing by the population per state in each data year.  This 
gives the number of payday lenders and the total dollar amount borrowed per capita per state, 
which serves as the data for the dependent variable in this study.  Further, the number of lenders 
per state was divided by 1,000 to give the number of lenders per 1,000 people to make the results 
easier to interpret. 
It is worth noting that an attempt was made to collect data on the number of payday 
lenders per state for the years 2006 and 2007, as well as data on the total dollar amount borrowed 
per state for the years 2006-2010.  This data was available in some states as some state banking 
and financial institution regulatory bodies collect this data, but many did not.  The data was 
therefore spotty and inconsistent and could not be used in this study.  This inconsistency is due to 
differing state regulations and subsequent reporting requirements, and a recommendation follows 
that all states begin comprehensive collection of predatory lending data to track industry activity. 
As for the independent variables, the trust data per state was obtained from several 
sources so as to test and compare various measures of trust.  For the year 2005, data from the 
DDB Lifestyle Survey conducted in 2005 was used.  More specifically, data pertaining to the 
18 
 
trust question: “Most people are honest” was used wherein respondents chose from 1-6 in which 
1 corresponds to “Definitely Disagree” and 6 corresponds to “Definitely Agree.”  The raw data 
was aggregated for each state into the percentage of respondents who believe that most people 
are honest (and therefore are trusting) by dividing the number of respondents who chose 4, 5 or 6 
over the total number of respondents.  The same was done with the DDB Lifestyle Survey 
conducted in 2008, only with data from their updated trust question: “How much do you trust: 
People you meet for the first time?” for which the scale also included 1-6, wherein 1 corresponds 
to “Do not trust at all” and 6 corresponds to “Trust completely.”  The raw data for 2008 was also 
aggregated for each state into the percentage of respondents who believe that you can trust 
people you meet for the first time (those who chose 4, 5 or 6) of the total number of respondents.  
In order to make use of the payday lending data obtained for 2008, 2009 and 2010, the data from 
this 2008 survey was duplicated and used for the years 2009 and 2010 as data for the 2009 and 
2010 DDB Lifestyle Surveys was not available.  It is posited that trust measures do not change 
enough over two years to warrant any statistical changes in the data and therefore the data is 
relatively accurate.   
Further, a second measure was used for the year 2008 to check the validity of different 
measures of trust that have been established by various country-wide surveys.  Data from the 
American National Election Survey trust question: “Generally speaking, would you say that most 
people CAN BE TRUSTED, or that you CAN'T BE TOO CAREFUL in dealing with people?” 
in which respondents answered 1 for “Most people can be trusted” and 2 for “Can’t be too 
careful” was also tested against payday lending data.  This data was aggregated for each state 
and calculated as a percentage of those who answered 1 out of the total respondents.  The last 
measure of trust used in this study is the data from Robert Putnam’s book entitled Bowling Alone 
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in which he collected 14 measures of social capital indicators in 1999.  The social capital 
indicator used in this paper is the one derived from a state level trust measure created from the 
statement: “Most people can be trusted.”  The data included in the book was in the form of 
percentages for each state, and was used as such.   
There were six other independent control variables used in the regressions as well.  They 
include gross domestic product per capita for each state taken as is from the U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (2012), and the unemployment rate for each state taken as is from the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics (2012).  They also include the poverty rate for each state taken as is from the 
U.S. Census Bureau (2008), and the total educational enrollment per capita for each state taken 
from the National Center for Education Statistics (2012).  The educational enrollment data was 
normalized by dividing by population, taken from the Census Bureau, per state in each data year.  
The minority percentage of the population per state was taken from the U.S. Census Bureau 
(2011).  For this variable, data was taken for both the black population and Hispanic population 
and added together to obtain the minority population, which was then divided by total population 
per state to get the percentage.  Lastly, the percentage of the population aged 18-29 and 65+ per 
state was also taken from the U.S. Census Bureau (2012).  Similarly, this variable was obtained 
by adding the data for the age range of 18-29 to the data for the age range of 65 and up then 
dividing by total population per state to get a percentage of age ranges evidenced to be more 
vulnerable to predatory lending.  These variables were all collected for the years 2005, 2008, 
2009 and 2010.   
To provide a visual display of the models used in this study, the following equations 
represent the regressions that were performed: 
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Table 1.  Empirical Models for the Regressions 
Regression Empirical Equation 
#1  lenders = β1(gdp) + β2(un) + β3(pov) + β4(educ) + β5(min) + β6(age) + β7(ddb08) 
#2 lenders = β1(gdp) + β2(un) + β3(pov) + β4(educ) + β5(min) + β6(age) + β7(anes08) 
#3 amount = β1(gdp) + β2(un) + β3(pov) + β4(educ) + β5(min) + β6(age) + β7(ddb05) 
#4 lenders = β1(gdp) + β2(un) + β3(pov) + β4(educ) + β5(min) + β6(age) + β7(ddb05) 
#5 amount = β1(gdp) + β2(un) + β3(pov) + β4(educ) + β5(min) + β6(age) + β7(basoccap) 
#6 lenders = β1(gdp) + β2(un) + β3(pov) + β4(educ) + β5(min) + β6(age) + β7(basoccap) 
 
It is essential to take a look at the summary statistics for the data used in this study.  
There are two data sets for which to examine the summary statistics – one for 2005 data and one 
for 2008, 2009 and 2010 data.  Starting with the 2008-2010 dataset, the following table gives the 
mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum for all of the variables utilized in the first two 
regressions: 
Table 2.  Summary Statistics for 2008-2010 Data 
Variable Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
lenders .099 lenders per 
1,000 people 
.074 lenders per 
1,000 people 
0.000 lenders per 
1,000 people 
.357 lenders per 
1,000 people 
gdp $40,610 per capita  $7,497 per capita $28,596 per capita $63,252 per capita 
un 7.10% 2.22% 2.70% 14.70% 
pov 14.02% 3.00% 7.50% 22.40% 
educ 16.72% 5.73% 7.37% 73.99% 
min 20.54% 12.70% 2.50% 51.39% 
age 28.50% 2.26% 23.63% 34.93% 
ddb08 29.84% 9.43% 0.00% 56.52% 
anes08 33.52% 25.64% 0.00% 100.00% 
 
As evident from the table, the lenders variable – number of lenders per state – exhibits 
considerable spread from the mean, shown by the standard deviation.  The table also shows that 
the anes08 trust measure is characterized by a much larger deviation from the mean than the 
ddb08 trust measure, which may indicate that it is a less reliable measure. 
The next table, representing the dataset for 2005, gives the mean, standard deviation, 
minimum and maximum for all of the variables utilized in the last four regressions: 
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Table 3.  Summary Statistics for 2005 Data 
Variable Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
lenders .122 lenders per 
1,000 people 
.086 lenders per 
1,000 people 
0.000 lenders per 
1,000 people 
.389 lenders per 
1,000 people 
amount $139.19 borrowed 
per capita 
$135.30 borrowed 
per capita 
$13.08 borrowed 
per capita 
$782.94 borrowed 
per capita 
gdp $32,435 $3,618 $24,820 $38,408 
un 4.93% 1.12% 2.80% 7.90% 
pov 13.21% 2.99% 7.60% 21.00% 
educ 16.39% 1.33% 14.12% 20.39% 
min 19.26% 12.52% 1.90% 47.00% 
age 26.77% 1.63% 20.50% 30.80% 
ddb05 52.70% 10.47% 20.00% 72.72% 
basoccap 44.45% 12.37% 17.00% 67.00% 
  
It is evident from this table that both of the proxies for payday lending activity, lenders 
and amount are characterized by a relatively large deviation from their means.  Further, it is 
notable that the ddb05 trust measure has a higher mean than the basoccap social capital index.   
The following tables display the lending and trust data graphically for each year: 
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It is worth noting that for the 2008, 2009 and 2010 data – for which the graphs look 
similar as the same trust data was used for all three years – there seem to be a few outliers only 
for the ANES 2008 data.  The three outliers are Hawaii, Iowa and Utah.  These three states 
received a response of 1, or “Most people can be trusted,” from all of the questionnaire 
respondents.  However, this may most likely be due to the relatively few respondents that 
answered that question for those states.  Also, in all of the graphs the state of California seems as 
though it may be an outlier due to the high number of payday lenders it had each year coupled 
with a relatively average trust measure – again this may only be due to the sheer size of the state 
and thus the number of payday lenders that operate within its borders. 
V. Empirical Results 
 
The analysis produced an interesting mix of results.  Heteroskedasticity was taken into 
account while performing the regression analyses, as it is a possibility that there is some variance 
in the error term given the value of the trust measure.  Overall the model is adequate: the R2 is 
.327 for the first regression and the adjusted R2 is .287, which is low.  For the second regression 
the R2 is .312 and the adjusted R2 is .265 – similar to the first regression.  As a reminder, the only 
difference in these two regressions is the trust measure used: the first using DDB Lifestyle in 
2008 and the second using ANES in 2008.  The R2 and adjusted R2 for the remainder of the 
regressions vary, and the adjusted R2 are presented in Table 4 below.  These low numbers 
indicate that the explanatory variables explain only a part of the variation in the dependent 
variable, or payday lending activity.  This does not necessarily mean that the model is not a good 
fit, but that all of the factors that affect payday lending have not been accounted for in this 
analysis, or that the dataset is not large enough.  Also the R2 tends to be lower as more variables 
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are added.  The following table summarizes the results of the six regression analyses, with 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors:  
 
Table 4. OLS Regression Results 
Independent 
Variable 
Coefficient and Standard Error 
#1: Number of 
Lenders for   
2008-2010 
#2: Number of 
Lenders for 
2008-2010 
#3: $ Amount 
Borrowed for 
2005 
#4: Number of 
Lenders for 
2005 
#5: $ 
Amount 
Borrowed 
for 2005 
#6: Number 
of Lenders 
for 2005 
gdp 
5.354E-10 2.936E-9** -0.000640 -4.751E-9 -0.0163* -1.466E-8 
(1.097E-9) (1.183E-9) (0.0163) (9.200E-9) (0.00855) (6.657E-9) 
un 
-0.00000792*** -0.00000704** -7.098 -0.00000584 7.361 7.233E-8 
(0.00000290) (0.00000317) (22.347) (0.0000130) (16.0986) (0.0000135) 
pov 
0.00001556*** 0.00000213*** 17.192 0.00000940 -9.246 -7.312E-8 
(0.00000385) (0.00000407) (25.766) (0.0000130) (8.626) (0.00000772) 
educ 
-0.00000108** -9.902E-7** -10.553 -0.00000439 -9.109 -0.00000930 
(4.373E-7) (4.741E-7) (16.723) (0.0000121) (12.206) (0.00000897) 
min 
-1.138E-7 -8.474E-7 -1.331 -3.316E-8 0.737 4.285E-7 
( 4.839E-7) 5.439E-7 (3.191) (0.00000161) (1.541) (0.00000116) 
age 
-0.00000872*** -0.0000112*** -0.775 -0.00000179 -15.116 -0.0000145 
(0.00000265) (0.00000302) (20.187) (0.0000113) (11.328) (0.00000864) 
ddb08 
-0.00000128** -- -- -- -- -- 
(5.945E-7) -- -- -- -- -- 
anes08 
-- 1.342E-7 -- -- -- -- 
-- 2.293E-7 -- -- -- -- 
ddb05 
-- -- 1.969 0.00000104 -- -- 
-- -- (1.930) (0.00000104) -- -- 
basoccap 
-- -- -- -- -1.945 3.930E-7 
-- -- -- -- (2.0400) (0.00000145) 
Adj-R2 0.287 0.265 -0.0849 0.0342 0.200 0.193 
N 126 111 39 40 33 33 
*p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01 
 
 Looking more closely at the parameters of interest, which are in bold in the table, it is clear to see 
that the only trust measure that showed any statistical significance was the DDB Lifestyle Survey trust 
question in 2008 from the first regression.  The interpretation of the parameter for the trust variable ddb08 
is as follows: if the trust measure for a state increases by 1%, this indicates that the number of payday 
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lenders in that state per 1,000 people is 0.00000128 less, or .00128 less for every 1 million people, 
holding all other factors constant.  This is the expected direction.  Obviously, the level of trust in a 
community does not have a large impact on the level of payday lending activity, but there is a slight 
relationship.  However, this relationship can only be detected using the DDB Lifestyle Survey data for 
2008, and a similar relationship is not discovered between the payday lending activity data and the other 
measures of trust (ANES 2008, DDB Lifestyle 2005, and the Bowling Alone social capital index).   
 Looking at the other significant independent variables, only un, pov, educ, and age are significant 
in the first regression.  The interpretation of these variables is as follows: if the unemployment rate 
increases by 1%, this indicates that the number of payday lenders in that state per 1,000 people is 
0.00000792 less holding other factors constant, which is not the expected direction.  However, this does 
make sense as those who are unemployed will not have proof of income which may be needed to take out 
a payday loan.  Further, if the poverty rate increases by 1%, this indicates that the number of payday 
lenders in that state per 1,000 people is 0.0000156 higher holding other factors constant, which is the 
expected direction.  If the total educational enrollment per capita increases by 1%, this indicates that the 
number of payday lenders in that state per 1,000 people is 0.00000108 less holding other factors constant, 
which is the expected direction.  Lastly, if the percentage of the population aged 18-29 and 65+ 
increases by 1%, this indicates that the number of payday lenders in that state per 1,000 people is 
0.00000872 less holding other factors constant, which is not the expected direction.  The 
standard errors for these parameters are relatively large compared to the coefficients, which 
indicates that the variance of the estimated parameters is large and therefore not very efficient.  
Also, it can be seen that for the third regression, in which the total dollar amount borrowed per 
state was regressed on the DDB Lifestyle Survey trust question for 2005 there is a negative 
adjusted R2 which indicates that this is not a good estimated model for the variables of interest.  
 As for the rest of the regression analyses, only number 2 displayed significant 
parameters, except for the parameter for gdp in regression 5, which uses the total dollar amount 
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borrowed per capita in 2005 as the dependent variable.  The same independent variables are 
significant in regression 2 as in regression 1, except the parameter of interest – that for anes08 – 
is not significant this time, but the parameter for gdp is, and is interpreted as follows: if GDP per 
capita increases by $1, this indicates that the number of payday lenders in that state per 1,000 
people is 2.936E-9 higher holding other factors constant, which is not the expected direction.  
These results indicate that the other trust measures, namely anes08, ddb05, and basoccap may be 
inferior to ddb08 and may imply that there are data quality issues with these three measures.   
 Sensitivity analyses were conducted for multicollinearity as well as for serial correlation 
of degree 1.  Also, the regressions were re-run excluding the insignificant explanatory variables.  
As for multicollinearity, it can be argued that there is a high correlation between unemployment 
and GDP, and also between the age and education variables, and therefore the six regressions 
were run without the unemployment and age independent variables – and also taking 
heteroskedasticity into account.  As for the rationale behind this, the rate of unemployment in a 
state in part determines the productivity of the local economy, which in turn can be translated 
into that state’s gross domestic product.  Further, the percentage of a state’s population made up 
of those between the ages of 18 and 29 as well as 65+ could be related to the total educational 
enrollment rate of that state as states with more young people and fewer seniors are expected to 
have higher enrollment rates.  The results of these regression analyses are as follows:  
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Table 5.  OLS Regression Results Correcting for Mutlicollinearity: 
Excluding Unemployment and Age 
Independent 
Variable 
Coefficient and Standard Error 
#1: Number of 
Lenders for   
2008-2010 
#2: Number of 
Lenders for 
2008-2010 
#3: $ Amount 
Borrowed for 
2005 
#4: Number of 
Lenders for 
2005 
#5: $ 
Amount 
Borrowed 
for 2005 
#6: Number 
of Lenders 
for 2005 
gdp 
2.735E-7 0.00000255** -0.000564 -0.00000429 -0.00987* -0.00000857 
(0.00000113) (0.00000118) (0.0111) (0.00000666) (0.00605) (0.00000517) 
pov 
0.0112*** 0.0162*** 15.812 0.00858 -3.618 0.00391 
(0.00397) (0.00422) (19.391) (0.0102) (8.263) (0.00695) 
educ 
-0.000782** -0.000910** -10.035 -0.00351 -2.539 -0.00277 
(0.000371) (0.000441) (13.162) (0.0103) (11.625) (0.00928) 
min 
0.000190 -0.000454 -1.369 -0.0000560 0.410 0.0000523 
( 0.000488) (0.000539) (3.417) (0.00166) (1.793) (0.00137) 
ddb08 
-0.00167*** -- -- -- -- -- 
(5.945E-7) -- -- -- -- -- 
anes08 
-- 0.00000285 -- -- -- -- 
-- (0.000244) -- -- -- -- 
ddb05 
-- -- 2.036 0.00109 -- -- 
-- -- (2.028) (0.00107) -- -- 
basoccap 
-- -- -- -- -2.645 -0.000266 
-- -- -- -- (2.004) (0.00146) 
Adj-R2 0.232 0.191 -0.0212 0.0876 0.212 0.213 
N 126 111 39 40 33 33 
*p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01 
 
 As can be seen from Table 5, the results are similar to those in Table 4.  The parameter of 
interest is significant in the first regression, and has a much larger coefficient.  To interpret the 
parameter: if the trust measure for a state increases by 1%, this indicates that the number of payday 
lenders in that state per 1,000 people is 0.00167 less, or 1.67 less for every 1 million people holding other 
factors constant.  The adjusted R2 however is lower, but not by much.  There is much less variance 
in the coefficient for ddb08, which may indicate evidence of multicollinearity in the original 
regressions, and thus this may be a better model.  Further, the possibility of serial correlation of 
degree 1 was tested.  Serial correlation may be a concern as data collection protocol and 
subsequently human error may cause the error term to depend on the year the data was collected 
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for payday lending activity.  However, the results indicate that serial correlation is not present in 
this analysis.  Finally, looking at the results from running the regressions without the 
insignificant explanatory variables – min and gdp – the results are similar, yet the coefficients of 
the estimated parameters are much larger.  The same variables are significant as in the first set of 
regressions, and in the same direction, yet the coefficient on ddb08 is now -.00142, 1,000 times 
larger than that in the first regression.  It is also significant at the .01% level, whereas previously 
it was only significant at the .05% level.  However, the adjusted R2 for this regression is .246, 
lower than previously.  Aside from ddb08, the other trust measures do not show any statistical 
significance.  Overall, this is evidence that dropping the insignificant variables makes a 
difference in the impact of the trust measure on payday lending activity, but it is not a better 
model. 
In general these results are consistent with the theory’s predictions.  Looking only at the 
first regression from Table 4 – noting that the parameter of interest was not significant in the 
remaining five regressions – there are five significant variables, three of which are in the 
direction and magnitude that is consistent with the theory.  The three that are consistent with the 
theory are as follows: pov which has a positive coefficient, educ which has a negative 
coefficient, and ddb08 which has a negative coefficient and is between 0 and -1.  The two that 
are not are un which had a negative coefficient and age which also had a negative coefficient.  
This could be explained as follows: those who are unemployed would not have proof of income 
that may be needed for a payday loan and therefore would not be able to take out a loan.  Also, it 
is possible that the age range that is most likely to take out payday loans on a national scale 
would fall in between the ages of 29 and 65.  Looking only at the first regression from Table 5, 
which accounts for multicollinearity, there are three significant variables, and all three of those 
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are in the direction and magnitude consistent with the theory.  The three variables are pov which 
has a positive coefficient, educ which has a negative coefficient, and ddb08 which has a negative 
coefficient and is between 0 and -1.  Lastly, looking only at the first regression in which the 
insignificant variables were dropped, the results are also consistent with the theory’s predictions 
as the coefficient for ddb08 is negative and between 0 and -1. 
  Comparing these results with those of other researchers, the results are consistent with 
other studies in terms of the impact of poverty and education on payday lending activity.  
Previous papers as mentioned in the literature review, such as Gallmeyer and Roberts’ 2009 
study, have found evidence that poverty can exacerbate the concentration of predatory lenders 
and that a more educated population can reduce the use of predatory lending.  However, the 
results of this study do not provide evidence that agrees with previous studies in regard to 
minority populations and the young and elderly population in terms of the existence of predatory 
lenders in areas where those populations are more concentrated.  This may be rectified by the 
fact that the unit of study in this analysis is the state and the unit of study in previous research is 
much smaller. 
As mentioned in the introduction, the implications for the findings of this study include 
efforts to formulate policies that aim to increase levels of social capital and trust in communities.  
However, though there was some evidence that trust levels have a negative relationship with 
predatory lending activity, the coefficients were not large and may not warrant policy changes 
until further research areas are explored, as outlined in the conclusion.  Nonetheless, there are 
many benefits to increasing the level of social capital and trust in communities as well as 
reducing payday lending activity and predatory lending more generally.  The findings of this 
study shed some light on a new aspect of community life that relates to predatory lending and 
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will aid in efforts to curb this lending by providing valuable insight into its causes.  More 
directly, this study will serve as a segway to open up new avenues of research that will provide 
valuable insight into the predatory lending industry.  It is also recommended that this study serve 
as a catalyst for more comprehensive and consistent data collection practices among state 
regulatory offices. 
VI. Summary and Conclusions 
The purpose of this paper has been to address a gap in theory pertaining to the relation 
between payday lending activity in each state and the level of trust and social capital in that state.  
This research has been motivated by the fact that as of yet no study has explicitly looked at the 
association between predatory lending and the overall level of trust and social capital in a 
community.  As mentioned previously, most of the studies done thus far regarding predatory 
lending focus on the negative effects of these loans on the borrowers’ financial situation, the 
predatory practices and economic impact of payday lenders, the location decisions of payday 
lenders and the types of borrowers they target, industry regulation, as well as borrower 
knowledge and perceptions of payday lenders and alternative options they have available.   
The contributions of this study include evidence that there is a relationship between both 
the concentration of payday lenders in each state and trust, as well as the volume of payday 
activity and trust.  The topic of trust and social capital has not been studied previously in relation 
to the predatory lending industry and this serves as the catalyst for new directions of future 
research.  This is a national study that employs data from 40 U.S. states, all those for which 
consistent data were available.  Previous studies have only examined a region of the U.S. 
As for policy implications, the findings of this study indicate that efforts to formulate 
policy that aim to increase levels of social capital and trust in communities would be beneficial.  
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As there are many obvious benefits to increasing the level of social capital and trust in 
communities, reducing payday lending activity and predatory lending more generally is but one 
of these possible benefits.  The findings of this study have shed light on how the social fabric of 
a community may fuel predatory lending and can aid in efforts to curb this lending locally by 
providing valuable insight into its causes.  This research could support advocacy efforts to this 
end. 
 There are a few shortcomings to this research, including the relatively small dataset.  It 
would be beneficial to have more years of data for both number of lenders and total dollar 
amount borrowed, however consistent data across states was not available.  It would also be 
beneficial to have additional years of data for the trust measures.  This eliminated the possibility 
to perform fixed-effect analysis which could account for fixed effects across states.  There are 
also limitations to these findings in that quality issues may be present in regard to the trust 
measure data for the DDB Lifestyle Surveys and the ANES.   
 Out of these limitations come numerous directions for future research.  Some of these 
include re-conducting this study in the future after more comprehensive data collection practices 
have been put into use by state regulatory offices.  Bi-directionality could also be addressed in 
that there may be a relationship in which the instance of payday lenders affects the level of trust 
in a society.  Instrumental variables could be used to this effect.  Future research could also 
include studying this question at the county level at various locations around the U.S., which 
could help to standardize the different regional laws and regulations pertaining to predatory 
lending.  More specifically, those states with no regulation could be studied separately from 
those outlawing predatory lending.  Further, the impact and success of various regulatory 
strategies could be examined.   
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Further, there are many other related areas of predatory lending that exist in addition to 
payday lending that could be studied, including pawn shops, title loan companies, as well as the 
burgeoning online payday lending industry.  It is also advisable to study traditional banking 
institutions and their use of payday loans, including the differences in interest rates charged.  The 
avenues for future research and discovery, and consequently new regulations are practically 
endless.  This study has provided another piece to the puzzle in the campaign to curb predatory 
lending practices in the United States. 
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